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to fairness and applies it to the labor market. By influencing judgments about what is a 
fair wage readjustment, it can lead to coordination failures, generating downward 
nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and disinflation costs even with common knowledge of 
credible policies. This suggests that policies with good frames, including inflation 
targeting, can mitigate the sacrifice ratio. 
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The New Keynesian Phillips curve does not explain the causes behind the relationship 
or the costs of credible gradual disinflation.1 However, a proposed explanation involves 
coordination failure related to higher order expectations.2 Although the present study is 
aligned with this view, unlike most studies, it follows Simonsen (1988), who proposed 
that positive sacrifice ratios can occur even with common knowledge about the rate of 
reduction in the growth of nominal aggregate demand. 
This paper’s contribution is to propose that one mechanism behind this effect (which 
could be called ‘the Simonsen effect’), is that guessing which level of (nominal) wage 
readjustment is considered fair is a Keynesian ‘beauty contest’ in which loss avoidance 
can influence the choice of strategies. This concept was introduced by Cachon and 
Camerer (1996) (hereafter CC) as an equilibrium selection principle under which agents 
expect that others will avoid strategies that always result in real losses. This paper 
extends this concept to incorporate the idea that agents might also believe that others 
tend to avoid strategies resulting in nominal payoffs below a reference point under a 
given frame. 
1. Concepts and the Coordination Game in the Labor Market 
Definition I: reference points are the frontiers between losses and gains in individual 
choice.3 
Definition II: reference transactions are the frontiers between losses and gains 
associated with transactions with others.4 
                                                 
1
 See, e.g., Ball (1994) and Fuhrer (2006). 
2
 See, e.g., Woodford (2003). 
3
 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
4
 See, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986, hereafter KKT). 
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Both are also simply called references. A transaction of special interest is the 
payment involved in the interaction between worker and firm; the wage. 
Definition III: an unfair wage is one set below important references unless the firm 
has a good justification, such as a difficult financial situation.5 
The past nominal wage is considered the most important reference,6 but the expected 
wage readjustment of other workers is also considered an important one.7 This can lead 
to a coordination problem where a broader concept of loss avoidance may play a role in 
solving. CC’s original concept of loss avoidance and Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) 
concept of a frame are: 
Definition IV: Loss Avoidance (original definition) is an equilibrium selection 
principle in which (players) “expect others to avoid strategies that always result in 
losses.” 
Definition V: a frame is the way agents receive information, reflecting which 
information is salient. It influences the determination of agents’ references and 
expectations about the references of others and defines how salient those references are. 
This paper proposes the following concept of loss avoidance. 
Definition VI: Loss Avoidance (broader concept) is the belief that under a frame in 
which a real or nominal reference is sufficiently salient, there is a tendency for others to 
avoid strategies that are expected to result in outcomes framed as losses. 
The laboratory experiment by Fehr and Tyran (2001) corroborates this kind of loss 
avoidance, although they do not use this particular term. Although they analyze a game 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., KKT and Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996). 
6
 See, e.g., KKT. 
7
 See, e.g., KKT. 
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with a unique pure strategy equilibrium, loss avoidance in the form proposed here 
influences higher order beliefs during the evolutionary path taken to reach it. 
Because past inflation is usually very salient, it is the main bad reference in 
disinflation. Regarding DNWR, it is worth noting that Bewley (2005) criticizes Keynes 
for proposing that “downward wage rigidity is explained by employees’ preoccupation 
with pay differentials with respect to workers in similar jobs at other firms,” because 
Bewley “found, however, that such external pay differentials are not an issue, except in 
highly unionized industries.”8 However, if Keynes’ proposition is interpreted merely as 
a concern with maintaining relative pay positions, the concept of loss avoidance can 
conciliate Keynes’ proposition with DNWR through a concern about reference 
readjustment. This is conveyed by the equation below, with the fair wage readjustment 
being a readjustment similar to that expected to be received by other workers: 
log(WFt) – log(Wt-1) ≡ dwf t = Et-1[dwt] ≡ Et-1[log(Wt) – log(Wt-1)], 
where WFt is the average fair wage, Wt is the average wage, and dwf t is the (average) 
fair nominal wage readjustment, which is equal to the expected average wage 
readjustment Et-1[dwt], which can be influenced by frames and social norms. 
To understand this chain, consider the game described in Figure 1, in which the real 
payoffs of firm k are a function of its own wages and those set by other firms. Prices are 
markups over wages and, when firms set nominal wages, they must decide whether to 
take into account references of workers that imply wages above the level compatible 
                                                 
8
 Page 311. 
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with full employment (‘bad references’). For the reasons below, the optimal response in 
the case described here is to choose the strategy chosen by other firms. 
– If all other firms consider the bad references, nominal wages and prices are high 
so the economy moves to high unemployment. In this case, if firm k chooses not 
to take the bad references into account, this behavior is considered unfair and the 
payoff of the firm is three, whereas firm k’s payoff would be six when taking bad 
references into account. 
– If other firms do not consider the bad references, nominal wages and prices are 
low so unemployment is low. In this case, if firm k takes the bad references into 
account, its costs and therefore its prices are too high, so its sales are below those 
of other firms and its payoff is just one. If firm k does not consider bad references 
and all firms do likewise, workers may not see this behavior as unfair when 
everyone realizes that they are in this good equilibrium. Hence, the payoff of 
each firm would be ten. 
Consequently, if the given frame treats bad references as salient, the expected 
probability that other firms will take them into account is high, which leads each firm to 
do so. 
2. Evidence and Implications for Policy 
This result reinforces the importance of existing literature on the role of central 
banks’ communication on coordination,9 bringing into focus the relevance of the design 
of the frame of a policy. Arguably, explicit inflation targeting generates a better frame 
in disinflation than does a monetary anchor. This is because it transfers to the targeted 
                                                 
9
 See, e.g., Morris and Shin (2002) and Demertzis and Viegi (2008). 
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inflation some of the headlines that would be dominated by references that promote 
inflation inertia, namely past inflation indices. More complex concepts (such as 
monetary targets and Taylor rules) are much less likely to be salient to ordinary 
cognition than is targeted inflation. While Demertzis and Viegi (2008) modeled the 
importance of inflation targeting as salient information to promote coordination among 
agents, they ignored loss avoidance and did not discuss disinflation. 
Whether inflation targeting generates better coordination is controversial, but forms a 
consensus in the literature.10 Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) found evidence that 
inflation targeting strongly and robustly affects sacrifice ratios. 
An interesting policy case is the Brazilian Real Plan, under which wage and price 
readjustments were officially pegged for three months to an exogenous daily index, 
replacing former informal pegging to past inflation. Subsequently, the index was frozen 
and inflation and unemployment decreased, thus successfully substituting a much lower 
reference for nominal wage readjustments. 
The asymmetry inherent in loss avoidance may also help explain the asymmetric 
effects of monetary policy.11 
3. Conclusion and Implications for Macroeconomic Theory 
The paper proposes a broader concept of loss avoidance and shows that a bad frame can 
lead the economy to a sub-optimal equilibrium during periods of disinflation, 
reinforcing concerns about central bank communication and favoring the proposition 
that policy makers should consider how macroeconomic information is framed. 
                                                 
10
 See, e.g., Mishkin and Schimdt-Hobbel (2007). 
11
 See, e.g., Cover (1992). 
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Regarding macroeconomic theory, this paper’s discussion helps to reconcile forward 
and backward looking Phillips curves12—salient past inflation may influence agents’ 
forecasts—and rehabilitates Keynes’s view of the mechanism behind DNWR.
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Fuhrer (2006). 
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Figures 
Behavior of other firms 
 
Take bad references into 
account 
Do not take bad references into 
account 
Macroeconomic 
consequences: 
 
High nominal wages and 
prices relative to nominal 
demand and, therefore, high 
unemployment. 
Low nominal wages and prices 
relative to nominal demand and, 
therefore, low unemployment. 
 
Consequences for firm k: 
effort is not reduced; because 
wages are the same as in other 
firms, price and sales are also 
the same. 
Consequences for firm k: effort is 
not reduced; because wages are 
higher than in other firms, its price 
is higher and the firm sells much 
less than others do. 
Takes bad 
references into 
account 
 Real payoff of firm k: 6 Real payoff of firm k: 1 
Consequences for firm k: 
effort is reduced, generating 
low productivity and low 
production. 
Consequences for firm k: effort is 
not reduced, and with the same 
wage and price of other firms, sales 
are also the same. 
Firm k 
Does not take bad 
references into 
account 
 Real payoff of firm k: 3 Real payoff of firm k: 10 
Figure 1: The nominal wage-setting coordination game. 
 
